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An Analysis of Interest Rate and Currency Swaps
Schuyler K. Henderson*
Companies in the United Kingdom developed currency swaps as
a-means of obtaining off-shore financing in the face of restrictive ex-
change controls in the mid-1970s.t From this particularized context,
swap financing has evolved into a 200 billion dollar industry and a
driving force in international capital markets. Despite the develop-
ment of swaps and their continued use as a means of obtaining eco-
nomic results which might otherwise be barred by restrictive
governmental regulations, the structure and form of swaps evolved
free from governmental regulation through negotiations between
separate parties on a case-by-case basis. A legal discussion of swaps
is thus primarily an analysis of contractual provisions.
This article will first describe swaps and some of their uses.
Next, it will discuss the credit exposure incurred by parties to a swap
agreement, the documentation required for swaps, certain regulatory
and tax implications of swaps, and some of the principal legal risks
involved in enforcing swap agreements. The article will conclude
with a description of several issues currently faced by leading swaps
institutions including the transfer and reduction of swap risk and the
securitization of swaps.
I. Description of Swaps
A typical interest rate swap involves an agreement between two
parties. The first party agrees to pay to the second party an amount
equal to the interest which would accrue on an agreed amount dur-
ing a given period at one type of interest rate. The second party
agrees to pay to the first party an amount equal to the interest which
would accrue on that agreed amount at another type of interest rate.
Virtually all common interest rates are regularly swapped: fixed,
prime, London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), 2 bankers accept-
* Partner, Sidley & Austin, London, England.
Many of the views and conclusions, with respect to swaps, expressed herein parallel
those expressed in Recent Innovations in International Banking, (Study Group established by
the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries), April 1986, published after submission
of this article in March, 1986.
1 Seegenerally S. HENDERSON &J. PRICE, CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE SWAPS (1984).
2 LIBOR is typically based on the average rate at which deposits are offered to prime
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ance, treasury bill, certificate of deposit, commercial paper and zero
coupon rates.
The economic relationship of the parties in a simple interest
swap agreement is illustrated in Figure 1. Party A is a company
which is about to incur LIBOR based debt, but desires long-term
fixed rate financing at a favorable rate, while Party B is a bank which
is about to incur fixed rate debt but desires funds on a LIBOR basis.
FIGURE 1
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In a typical currency swap, Party A agrees to pay a stated amount
in one currency to Party B, usually at periodic intervals. Party B
agrees to pay a stated amount in a different currency to Party A at the
same or different intervals. These amounts may be expressed as
either stated amounts due at stated times (in which case the interest
rate and principal components are implicit in the specified amounts)
or as interest accruing on principal amounts in different currencies
plus, at appropriate amortization dates, principal components. It is
possible, and not uncommon, to have the national interest rates ap-
plicable to each party's obligations in a currency swap calculated on
different bases. The interest rate and currency swap are thereby ef-
fectively combined.
The economic relationship of the parties in a combined currency
and interest rate swap agreement is illustrated in Figure 2. Party C is
a company with LIBOR dollar liabilities and Swiss franc revenues
while Party D has fixed rate Swiss franc liabilities and dollar
revenues.
banks in London for a specified period, and then is fixed for that period subject to change
at the commencement of the next period.
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FIGURE 2
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There are numerous variations on these swap structures, includ-
ing those with delayed effectiveness, periodic amortization of princi-
pal, periodic increase of principal, options to extend, options to
terminate, and other refinements. The only limitation on this variety
is the imagination of swaps specialists and, as discussed in greater
detail below, the existence of lending markets with unique invest-
ment criteria.
'II. Uses of Swaps
Swaps can be used for a number of purposes. The above dia-
grams represent the use of swaps to obtain direct financing. In each
example, one party has access to a given capital market on relatively
more favorable terms than does the other. In the first diagram Party
B is perhaps a European bank, well known in the Euromarkets, which
has not issued fixed rate Eurobonds in the past because its sources of
revenue are based on fluctuating rates of interest (for example, a LI-
BOR loan portfolio). Party A, less well known in the Euromarkets,
would only be able to issue Eurobonds at a rate per annum of at least
one percent in excess of the amount Party B could issue the bonds.
Party A, however, can obtain bank financing at a spread of one-half
percent over LIBOR while Party B would likely pay interest at LI-
BOR flat. Thus, the Eurobond market imposes a one percent credit
differential between the parties, and the bank lending market im-
poses a one-half percent differential between them. This may be be-
cause the Eurobond investor is more "name" sensitive while bank
lenders are able to conduct in-depth credit investigations. This dif-
ference in credit perceptions is arbitraged by each party incurring
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debt in the market in which it has a relatively more favorable recep-
tion. Through the swap, each can effectively obtain financing at a
lower rate.
In the second diagram, Party D represents a strong U.S. corpo-
ration, well known in the relatively thin Swiss franc capital market.
Party C is a supra-national borrower which, though a stronger credit
than Party D, has issued a substantial amount of Swiss franc debt in
the past. Because investors wish to diversify their portfolios, there is
less demand for Party C's Swiss franc denominated obligations. The
dollar market, however, is much deeper and less easily saturated.
Therefore the dollar capital market would impose a larger spread in
interest rates between the two parties than the Swiss franc capital
market; the spread in the dollar market more accurately reflecting
the real credit distinction between them. In this situation, the swap
arbitrages the difference in spreads which results from the difference
in depth between various capital markets, enabling each party to ob-
tain financing in the market in which it is most favorably received.
The existence of the swap market thus permits financial advisors
to devise debt obligations which may have narrow appeal in a
targeted investment market. Even though the debt obligations are
themselves unattractive to an issuer or borrower, the issuer or bor-
rower can take advantage of anomalies presented thereby and swap
into a favorable form of financing.
Swaps can also be used to alter a party's existing liability struc-
ture. A party with outstanding floating rate liabilities may desire to
prepay the debt and renegotiate a fixed rate debt when term rates
have fallen. Alternatively, it may choose to enter into an interest rate
swap and effectively convert its outstanding floating rate debt into a
fixed rate liability. Such a swap is not a form of direct financing but
instead represents the treasury function of managing an institution's
liability structure.
"Asset" swaps can also alter an investment in the hands of an
investor. For instance, an investor, for portfolio diversification rea-
sons, may be attracted to the credit of a particular issuer of a fixed
rate debt instrument but, because of its funding sources, desires a
floating rate asset. It can purchase the underlying fixed rate asset
and enter into a swap with another entity by which the investor
would pay a fixed rate equal to that paid on the asset purchased, and
receive a floating rate from the swap counterparty. Since, as de-
scribed below, swap payments are generally computed on a netted
basis, the investor effectively takes the primary credit risk of the is-
suer (for principal and interest payments to the extent that the float-
ing rate under the swap does not exceed the fixed rate on the asset)
but takes the credit risk of the counterparty only to the extent that
the floating rate under the swap exceeds the fixed rate on the asset
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during any period. The investor would also generally accept the risk
that the underlying debt instrument would be prepaid. This latter
risk is minimal since typically prepayment rights only arise in the un-
likely event of the imposition of a withholding tax.
Parties entering into swaps for direct financing or investment
purposes are termed "end-users." Parties desiring a swap on similar
terms, but from reverse perspectives, however, may not have a com-
mercial relationship with each other, be in the business of making
credit decisions or be able to directly find counterparties. Each
would have to seek a strong-credit financial institution to act as an
intermediary. The intermediary financial institution would, in effect,
stand in the middle by entering into matching reverse agreements
with each party, thereby bearing the credit risk of each. Each agree-
ment would typically be independent of the other. The end-users
may not know of the existence of the other counterparty. Thus, the
typical swap is not one illustrated in Figure 1 or 2, but a swap, as in
Figure 3, in which one or more financial institutions act as in-
termediaries between end-users.
FIGURE 3
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Therefore, the majority of swaps written involve a financial insti-
tution which enters into such agreements in the ordinary course of
its business to earn either spreads between matching swaps, a profit
on their swaps portfolio on an aggregate basis, or a combination of
the two. Many commercial banks view their swaps activity primarily
as part of their business in providing financial services to their cus-
tomers. Even if these banks do not enter into exactly matching
swaps and hedge their risk on a portfolio basis, they may still view
their primary function as one of providing a financial accommoda-
tion. Many investment banks and a number of commercial banks,
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conversely, view their swap activity primarily as part of their dealing
activities. Their profit is perceived as deriving from their ability to
enter, transfer, and terminate swaps on a portfolio basis.
III. Swaps Exposure
Swap risk can be analyzed on two levels: short-term exposure
and long-term exposure. Short-term exposure is the delivery risk on
a payment-by-payment basis (the risk to a party making payment that
the other party will not make the corresponding payment). A party's
delivery risk is increased if it is obligated to make a payment prior to
the other party's corresponding payment. An extreme example in an
interest swap would be a LIBOR against zero coupon swap where
one party makes six month LIBOR payments to the second party
semi-annually over a five year term and the second party pays its full
amount of accrued interest at a fixed rate on maturity. A more com-
mon example is one in which one party makes six month LIBOR
payments to another party that is paying an annual fixed amount.
Delivery risk is increased in a currency swap because payments
are made in different currencies and located in different time zones,
with the result that, even if payments are due on the same day, one
party may actually be required to deliver its currency to the other
prior to receipt of its payment. When there is an exchange of no-
tional principal amounts at maturity, this delivery risk is further in-
creased because the final amount will be substantially greater than
the individual periodic payments.
Long-term exposure is the value to a party, at any given time, of
the swap over its remaining term (the loss which a party would incur
if its counterparty were unable to perform or if the swap were to
terminate for other reasons). In the first illustrated example above,
each party may have incurred its underlying indebtedness (the bond
issue by Party B and the LIBOR loan by Party A) in expectation of
the swap. Thus, termination of the swap will result in each party
having lost the benefit of its bargain and being exposed to future rate
fluctuations because of its now mismatched position. The long-term
exposure of each party to the other is the cost to it of replacing the
cash flows (its payments and receipts) under the terminated swap.
IV. Documentation
One of the primary purposes of legal documentation in com-
mercial transactions, other than setting forth the terms of the trans-
action in order to avoid doubt and ambiguity, is to provide a basis for
enforcement by one party if the other party experiences credit diffi-
culties or defaults on its obligations. Virtually all institutions will
thus seek to reduce delivery and term exposure through specific pro-
vision in the swap agreement. Any institution analyzing its position
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on specific swap provisions must take into account its institutional
policies toward aggregate exposure and exposure to individual
counterparties. A party, such as a bank, which views its swap activi-
ties as a financial service, may take a more credit-oriented approach
to individual swap transactions. A party, such as an investment bank,
which views its swap activities as a dealer function, may take a more
standardized approach to documentation, relying on the public rat-
ing of its counterparties or certain credit enhancement methods. A
party, such as a corporation, utilizing the swap for a direct financing,
may be content to accept the documentation of its financial insti-
tution counterparty, as long as the provisions are relatively
evenhanded.
Early swap documentation involved individual agreements be-
tween counterparties, usually with bank intermediaries, with the end-
users seeking to obtain direct financing through a swap which, in re-
ality, represented a simplified back-to-back loan. Documentation
was in the nature of a loan agreement, but substantially less compli-
cated because the exposure was regarded as less than that of direct
lending risk, due to the conditional nature of the payments. Swaps
evolved from this individualized mirror context to a more dealer-ori-
ented business based on telephone commitments, followed by telex
confirmation with subsequent formal documentation. As the volume
of swaps increased dramatically in 1982, many institutions developed
standard forms for these transactions. Nonetheless, substantial
backlogs developed at active swaps institutions in 1983 and 1984.
The first response of many institutions was to develop a form of
master agreement which the institution could enter into with a given
counterparty with whom it expected to do a number of future trans-
actions. The master agreement provides the terms and conditions
which apply to each separate transaction, each of which comes into
effect through exchange of a relatively short supplement to the
master agreement.
Significant variations, however, existed between different insti-
tutions' documents, resulting in negotiation and consequent delays.
In addition, institutions preferring a dealer's approach to swaps be-
lieved that standardization of terms would assist in the development
of a more liquid swap market. In 1985, two publications provided
publicly available forms to which reference could be made for incor-
poration of standard terms and conditions. 3 Both publications con-
tain standard terms to which parties can refer in establishing swaps
between themselves. While these publications, particularly the for-
3 In the United States, International Swaps Dealers Association, Inc., CODE OF STAN-
DARD WORDING, AssuMvrIONS AND PROVISIONS FOR SWAPS (1986); in the United Kingdom,
British Bankers Association, INTEREST RATE SWAPS (1985) (commonly referred to as
"BBAIRS" terms).
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mer, leave a number of items open to negotiation between the par-
ties, these codes are resulting in standardization of the mechanical
and technical aspects of swap transactions. In addition, form master
agreements are being prepared for use with the codes or, for cur-
rency swaps, on a basis consistent with the codes.
Most provisions of a swap agreement, other than those "boiler-
plate" provisions common to many forms of contracts and those pro-
visions which set forth mechanical details, can be analyzed as ad-
dressing either short-term exposure or long-term exposure. Swap
agreements typically include provisions for reducing short-term ex-
posure through contractually providing for netting, conditionally of
obligation and set-off. If payments are due on the same day,' they are
typically netted off against each other with only the difference being
paid. In a pure interest swap, netting is accomplished by comparing
the two amounts and requiring the party owing the larger amount to
pay the difference to the other. When payment dates are only par-
tially simultaneous (for example, semi-annual LIBOR against annual
fixed), netting can be achieved by "rolling over" the first semi-an-
nual amount calculated in each year. This first amount is added to
the notional principal amount during the second semi-annual period
for purposes of calculating the second semi-annual period's LIBOR
amount. The annual LIBOR payment is the aggregate of the two
calculated amounts.
In the currency swap, netting is accomplished by first converting
one of the amounts due into the currency of the other at then current
spot exchange rates. This converted amount is compared to the
other amount due, and the party owing the larger amount is required
to pay only the difference to the other. If netting is not feasible and,
due to the different time zones of the relevant financial centers, si-
multaneous payments cannot be made, the only safe method to re-
duce delivery exposure is through escrow arrangments. In this
arrangement, the party paying in the financial center which opens
later deposits its required amount into the escrow bank in that finan-
cial center on the preceding business day so that payments can be
made by an appropriate time in the other location.
The process of netting marginally increases concerns regarding
the application of the gambling or gaming prohibitions of various
jurisdictions since it is common for the statutory definition of a gam-
ble or wager to include a party making payment to another in an
amount based on the difference between the value of two items on a
given date. Most U.S. and English lawyers have concluded that, so
long as the parties have an actual economic interest in the fluctuation
of interest or currency rates, the commercial investment interest of
the parties would foreclose a successful defense based on wagering.
The conclusion does not rest on an analysis of the portion of the
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gambling statute which refers to contingencies but focuses on the
fact that commercial transactions of this sort are not of a type cus-
tomarily referred to as "bets or wagers. ' 4
Whether or not netting or escrow arrangements are feasible,
swap agreements generally condition each party's payment on the
other party having made, or simultaneously making, all payments
then due from it. Some agreements also provide for deferral of a
party's payment if an event of default is continuing with respect to
the recipient. Other agreements go a step further and provide that,
if the early payor feels insecure or if potential events of default have
occurred with respect to the other, the early payor can request a roll-
ing over. The effect is that the early payor is not forced to make a
payment at a time when it may feel the creditworthiness of the other
has declined. In both cases, the agreement seeks to reduce the risk
that a party would have to pay under circumstances where the other
party has either failed to make required payments or might be unable
to make corresponding or future payments.
As a final precaution, the parties will generally grant a right of
set-off to each other for amounts mutally owing under the agreement
and, in some cases, the agreements will also provide a right to set off
mutually owing amounts under other swap agreements as well.
While such rights may not be fully or immediately effective in favor
of a party in the event of the other party's bankruptcy, 5 set-off rights,
4 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (1977) provides ,that "[a]ll wagers, bets or stakes,
made to depend upon any ... unknown or contingent event whatever shall be unlawful."
Section 5-411 further provides that "[a]ll contracts for or on account of any money or
property, wagered, bet or staked, as provided in Section 5-40 1, shall be void." Id. § 5-411.
The statute itself offers no assistance on what these words mean and the case law provides
little guidance in the interpretation of these provisions in the context of business transac-
tions. One New York court has carved out a "commercial purpose" exception to the stat-
ute, holding that when a party to a business venture has a "genuine personal stake" in the
outcome of future events that are the subject of a contract, such as when he has "an insura-
ble interest, an investment, or a contract involving goods or commodities," the transaction
is judicially enforceable and, regardless of risk, does not amount to bet, wager, or illegal
gamble. In Liss v. Manuel, 58 Misc. 2d 614, 296 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1968), the court stated
that:
[When] a sum of money is put merely to abide a contingent event, at which
time the event will determine to whom the money shall go, the transaction is
clearly a wager. If, on the other hand, the money is used in the speculative
enterprise, the reward of success is deemed a return on investment. The
difference is that the investor does something, or attempts to do something
to influence the favorable outcome of the venture, while the gambler pas-
sively awaits (or he should) the happening of the fortuitous event. The ab-
sence of a working investment, with money passing only after the event, is
one of the indicia of an illegal wager.
Id. at 631. Informal discussions with U.S. and New York banking and other regulatory
authorities would indicate that they do not regard swap agreements as gambling contracts.
5 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). The right of the solvent party to set-off any pre-petition
claim which it has against a debtor subject to bankruptcy proceedings in the United States
against pre-petition liabilities of the debtor to the solvent party will generally be pre-
served. The right of set-off is not preserved with respect to certain types of claims which
arose within 90 days before commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding or represent an
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tied in to conditionality, will provide substantial protection.
V. Long Term Exposure
The provisions of a swap agreement which address long-term
exposure can be analyzed in five categories: substantive credit con-
trols; increased costs by reason of taxes or changes in law; controls
with respect to subsequent illegality; right to terminate; and right to
receive compensation on termination.
A. Substantive Credit Controls
A party's commercial concerns about the creditworthiness of its
counterparty and its approach to swaps in general will be most di-
rectly reflected in its attitude toward the following substantive credit
controls in the document: the closing documents, the representa-
tions and warranties, and the covenants and events of default. Clos-
ing documents and warranties lend assurance to each party at the
commencement of the transaction as to the other party's requisite
authority, financial standing, and compliance with governmental,
corporate and other contractual restrictions. Covenants and events
of default set the commercial and credit standards which serve as a
basis for the maintenance of the credit relationship. The failure of a
party to comply with these standards will make the other party want
to terminate its credit exposure.
B. Increased Costs
When parties enter into a swap agreement, they will generally
determine the tax, regulatory and other legal liabilities they expect
to incur. If these laws change, the assumptions of the parties at com-
mencement of the agreement may no longer be true. Therefore, it is
customary to include provisions in swap agreements which permit
the agreement to be terminated where there has been a change in
the laws relied on by one or both of the parties.
1. Taxes
Due to increased volume and competition, swap margins have
declined. Accordingly, changes in the law which increase the cost to
a swap party are more likely to destroy the value of the swap to the
affected party. For example, if a withholding tax is imposed on a
payment, the payee receives a smaller amount under the swap and, in
effect, has lost the value of its bargain. It is therefore customary, at
least in cross-jurisdictional swap transactions, to include a clause
improvement in the position of the solvent party during such 90 day period. An allowable
set-off claim will be treated in the bankruptcy proceeding as if it were a secured claim of
the solvent party against the debtor to the extent of the liability which the solvent party
owes to the debtor.
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providing for "grossing-up" if withholding taxes are imposed on
payments by one party to another. The effect of grossing-up is that
the payor pays additional amounts in favor of the payee so that, after
deducting the relevant tax and paying it to the relevant taxing au-
thority on behalf of the payee, the amount actually received by the
payee equals the amount specified in the agreement. The burden is
generally placed on the payor because the withholding tax is usually
imposed by the jurisdiction of the payor's incorporation or principal
place of business. Because payment of this additional amount will,
however, effectively destroy the value of the swap to the payor, the
payor will generally require the right to terminate the swap agree-
ment if withholding taxes become payable.
The principal U.S. tax issue arising in swaps involves the ques-
tion of withholding of U.S. federal income tax on swap payments.
Such withholding is a possibility whenever a U.S. entity, whether act-
ing domestically or through a foreign branch, enters into a swap with
a counterparty which is a foreign corporation. 6 The statutory with-
holding rate is thirty percent.7 This withholding rate may be re-
duced or eliminated, however, if the foreign counterparty is a
resident in a jurisdiction having a favorable income tax treaty with
the United States, or if the swap payments are effectively connected
with a trade or business conducted by such counterparty in the
United States.8
Technically, withholding tax is a tax imposed on the foreign
counterparty's U.S. source income. 9 As the agent responsible for
withholding, the U.S. party is required to retain the withholding and
pay the same to the U.S. government. The government can collect
such amount directly from the U.S. party even if no withholding has
actually occurred.10
As relevant to swap agreements, withholding of U.S. tax applies
to payments of "fixed or determinable annual or periodical" income
from sources within the United States.' I Examples of fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical (FDAP) income given in the Internal
Revenue Code include interest, dividends, rents, wages, premiums
and annuities.' 2 It is generally agreed that, while swap agreements
employ many of the same terms used in loan agreements to describe
the amounts due thereunder, swaps are not loans. Swap payments
6 Similar concerns would arise if the counterparty were a nonresident alien individ-
ual or noncorporate foreign entity such as a foreign trust or partnership. Because swaps
with noncorporate parties are a rarity, however, they will not be separately considered
here.
7 I.R.C. § 1442(a) (1986).
8 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
9 I.R.C. § 1442(a) (1986).
10 Id. § 1461.
I I Id. § 1442(a).
12 Id. § 1441(b).
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are not considered interest for federal tax purposes, because such
payments are not compensation for the use or forbearance of
money.' 3 Since none of the other items specifically mentioned in the
statute are descriptive of swap payments, it is necessary to examine
the general meaning of FDAP income.
The FDAP concept is broader than might appear from the plain
meaning of the words. For example, income can be "periodical"
even if it is paid in a single lump sum, and it is "determinable" when-
ever there is a basis for calculating the amount to be paid. 14 One
type of income which clearly is not FDAP, however, is income or gain
from the sale of property.' 5 This exemption is based on the legal
requirement that withholding can only apply to the gross income re-
alized by foreign parties from U.S. sources. 16 Proceeds from the sale
of property are not gross income to the extent they represent a re-
turn of capital (basis) in the property sold. Although the amount of
gross proceeds paid by a U.S. buyer to a foreign party on a sale of
property would be definitely and easily ascertainable by the buyer,
the amount of gain realized by the foreign seller (the amount subject
to withholding), would not necessarily be known to anyone but the
seller. The exemption of capital gains is, thus, intended to make the
withholding system administrable on a practical basis.
In Commissioner v. Wodehouse 17 the U.S. Supreme Court suggested
that the rationale for this exemption should cover more items then
simply capital gains. Commenting upon the meaning of "annual"
and "periodical," the Court wrote:
Those words are merely generally descriptive of the character of the
gains, profits and income which arise out of such relationships as
those which produce readily withholdable interest, rents, royalties
and salaries, consisting wholly of income, especially in contrast to
gains, profits and income in the nature of capital gains from profita-
ble sales of real or personal property.' 8
Accordingly, the "character" of FDAP items is that they are
(i) readily withholdable and (ii) consist wholly of income. For the
reasons discussed above, proceeds from the sale of property do not
have this "character." Significantly, the Court did not limit the ex-
cluded category to such proceeds, but broadly construed it to in-
clude "gains, profits and income in the nature of capital gains."' 9
Payment received by a foreign counterparty in a swap may not
represent proceeds from the sale of property. 20 In virtually all cases,
13 See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 457 (1985).
'4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(a)(1), (2) (1960).
15 Id. § 1.1441-2(a)(3).
16 Id. § 1.881-2(a)(2) (1973).
17 337 U.S. 369, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 840 (1949).
Is Id. at 393-94.
19 Id.
20 Currency swaps may involve purchases or sales of property. For example, a swap
[VOL. I I
INTEREST RATES 'AND CURRENCY SWAPS
however, a significant component of such payments will either repre-
sent a return of the foreign party's prior investment in the transac-
tion, or be subject to offset by future investments which the party is
contractually bound to make. On any particular payment date (ex-
cept the last), the proportion, if any, of the payment which is actually
income to the foreign party cannot be known. A U.S. withholding
agent could make no more than an educated guess as to the appro-
priate amount to withhold on such payments. Hence, swap pay-
ments seem neither to be readily withholdable nor to consist wholly
(or even mostly) of income. They share the "character" of capital
gains, and for this reason should not be considered to be FDAP. 2 1
Unfortunately, whether or not swaps will be considered to be
FDAP is far from certain under current law. Aside from a rather ob-
scure ruling dealing with premiums by foreign insurers, the Internal
Revenue Service has never expressly adopted the view that payments
which are not sales proceeds, yet contain a return-of-investment ele-
ment or have other directly associated costs, are not FDAP. 22 The
courts have not developed the issue significantly since Wodehouse. In
the absence of authority more closely on point, many swap market
participants may feel that the FDAP rules by themselves are too un-
certain to rely upon in undertaking cross-border swaps.
Even if the income realized by the foreign party in a swap is
FDAP, it will not be subject to withholding unless it is derived from a
U.S. source. In Advance Notice 87-4, the Internal Revenue Service
held that income attributable to dollar denominated interest rate
swaps should generally be sourced at the place of the recipient. 23
Accordingly, swap income received by a non-U.S. person (a foreign
corporation, for example) will generally have a foreign source and
will, therefore, not be subject to withholding. A different rule ap-
in which U.S. corporation A agrees to deliver X dollars to Swiss corporation B in exchange
for Y Swiss francs on a date one year hence is probably a forward purchase of dollars by B
for tax purposes, and the delivery of dollars on the specified exchange date should not
raise U.S: withholding tax concerns. Similarly, if A's obligation under the swap is to de-
liver francs and B's obligation is to deliver dollars, the transaction is a forward sale of
dollars by B, also not subject to withholding. The fixed or determinable annual or periodi-
cal (FDAP) issue may become relevant in more complex currency swaps, however, and is
always a concern in dollar-denominated interest rate swaps.
21 Although the incomeelement in the last payment under a swap, if such payment
happens to be made to the foreign counterparty, is determinable, it would be anomalous
to have a withholding rule which applied only to last payments. Such payment will almost
certainly contain a return-of-investment component, an indication that it is "in the nature
of capital gains." It is noteworthy that a foreign seller's gain on a sale of property may in
some cases be determinable by a U.S. withholding agent, yet this fact does not cause such
transactions to be subject to withholding.
22 I.T. 1359, 1-1 C.B. 292, 294 (1922) (no withholding on such premiums, because
most would be added to loss reserves, and Congress intended that withholding only apply
to payments with "very high content" of net income), amplified and superceded Rev. Rul. 80-
222, 1980-2 C.B. 211.
23 Rev. Rul. 87-5, 1987-3 I.R.B.
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plies where the swap income is attributable to a U.S. trade or busi-
ness carried on by the non-U.S. recipient. Here, the swap income
will be sourced in the United States and, as described below, will
generally be subject to regular income taxation at the graduated tax
rates applied to the income of U.S. persons. Since it is subject to
direct taxation, it will not be subject to withholding.
The Notice does not deal with the tax treatment of currency
swaps. 24 A provision included in the recently enacted Tax Reform
Act of 1986 establishes a general rule that income derived from
transactions such as currency swaps should be sourced at the resi-
dence of the recipient.2 5 The legislation, however, grants regulatory
authority to the Treasury Department to determine the appropriate
tax treatment of income derived in hedging transactions. Both the
legislative history of the Act 26 and a recent release from the Service 27
recognize that a currency swap may be a hedging transaction.
Neither gives definitive guidance, however, so the possible applica-
tion of withholding to currency swaps is still an open issue. In addi-
tion, since Notice 87-4 only relates to income realized on or after the
date of the Notice, the possibility of withholding also remains open
with respect to interest swaps for prior open years of an entity which
has not made an election to apply the principles of the Notice to all
(but not part) of swap income in such years.
Even in situations where the application of the U.S. withholding
taxes to swap payments remains uncertain, relative certainty can
otherwise be obtained under certain circumstances. For instance,
there is an exemption from U.S. federal income tax of payments
made to international organizations, foreign governments, and gov-
ernmental entities not engaged in commercial activities in the United
States.28 A more useful rule is that swap payments which are effec-
24 The Notice by its terms deals only with interest rate swaps denominated in U.S.
dollars. Not even an interest rate swap in which the payment obligations of both parties
are denominated in the same foreign currency is within the purview of the Notice. The
risk of extending the conclusion of the Notice beyond its announced scope is explored
infra note 28 and accompanying text.
25 I.R.C. § 988(a)(3) (1986).
26 H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. No. 9B, at II 665 (1986).
27 I.R.S. Notice 87-11, 1987-4 (Jan. 26, 1987). According to this Notice, ifa non-U.S.
person enters into a "qualified hedging transaction" that gives rise to U.S. source interest
income (for example, the simultaneous acquisition of a debt instrument denominated in
dollars and a currency swap which effectively converts the instrument to one denominated
in foreign currency), the withholding provisions of U.S. law will "be applied separately to"
payments under the debt instrument and payments under the swap. Id. Whether the ap-
plication of the withholding provisions will lead to the application of the withholding tax
cannot be discerned with certainty from this language.
28 See I.R.C. § 892 (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.892-1(3) (1980), defining entities entitled
to this exemption. As drafted, Notice 87-4 does not appear to apply to swap income real-
ized by foreign governments, due to a gap in the coverage of the definition of "residence."
This leads to the anomalous result that a foreign government may be subject to withhold-
ing on swap income as part of its commercial activities whereas a privately-owned commer-
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tively connected to the conduct of a trade or business in the United
States by a foreign counterparty are not subject to withholding, but
are subject to direct U.S. income taxation at the regular corporate
rates.29 A common application of this principle is to swap transac-
tions with U.S. branches of foreign banks.
Income tax treaties are also widely relied upon to provide pro-
tection from withholding in cross-border swaps. Most treaties which
the United States has concluded with other countries contain provi-
sions exempting the "industrial and commercial profits" (sometimes
referred to as "business profits") earned by a resident of one of the
contracting states from tax by the other state, unless connected with
a permanent establishment located in the other state. 30 Accordingly,
if a foreign entity is entitled to the benefits of such a treaty and has
no office or other fixed place of business in the United States, it can
probably enter into swaps with U.S. parties without withholding tax
exposure. 31 Advance Revenue Ruling 87-532 has clarified whether
swap income would constitute "industrial and commercial profits"
under the relevant treaty. In this ruling, the Service held that a
Netherlands bank, not having a permanent establishment in the
United States, is exempt from federal income taxation on payments
made to it by the U.S. party in a dollar-denominated interest rate
swap, because the payments constitute "industrial or commercial
profits" within the meaning given the term in Article III of the In-
come Tax Convention between the United States and the Nether-
lands. 33 The Revenue Ruling is significant in that it dispels the fear
that the Service might seek to characterize swap payments as inter-
est, which is not fully exempt from withholding under many income
tax treaties that the United States has concluded with other coun-
tries. Moreover, the definition of industrial or commercial profits in
the Netherlands Convention-"income derived from the active con-
duct of a trade or business" 34-is generic. Thus the Revenue Ruling
ought to be equally applicable to other income tax treaties. Ques-
tions may remain, however, as to the applicability of this result where
the non-U.S. party to the swap is not a financial institution. 35 The
cial enterprise established in the same foreign jurisdiction would not be. This appears to
be a technical flaw that is likely to be corrected.
29 I.R.C. §§ 1442(a), 1441(c)(1) (1986) (establishing exemption from withholding);
id. § 882(a) (imposing regular corporate income tax). The counterparty must file Form
4224 annually with the U.S. withholding agent to be entitled to this exemption. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1441-4(a)(2) (1960).
30 See infra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
31 To establish this exemption, the counterparty must file Form 1001 with the U.S.
withholding agent once every three years. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-6(c) (1971).
32 Rev. Rul. 87-5, 1987-3 I.R.B.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Uncertainty is perhaps greatest where the swap is meant to hedge investment activ-
ities of the foreign counterparty, and least where the counterparty is a foreign bank enter-
19861
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
best protection is furnished by treaties with a "residual" clause pro-
viding an exemption for all items of income not dealt with specifi-
cally in the treaty. s6
2. Other Changes in the Law
The swap agreements of only a very few institutions address the
possibility of changes in reserve, liquidity, and risk asset ratio re-
quirements that could impose additional costs on parties subject to
the relevant regulations. The Bank of England, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Federal Reserve Board recently jointly announced revised require-
ments which include certain contingent liabilities in calculating risk
asset ratios (with respect to English banks) and capital adequacy
(with respect to U.S. banks), as well as the pending imposition of
similar requirements with respect to swaps. 37 The effect of these
changes may be to impose additional costs on a bank with respect to
its outstanding swap portfolio. A few banks customarily include in
their agreements clauses, similar to those found in Eurodollar loan
agreements, provisions for payment by the counterparty to the bank
the amount necessary to compensate the bank for increased costs
resulting from a change in regulation. Whether or not these clauses
would cover restrictions on overall capital ratios must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis. Generally, a party would, as with withhold-
ing taxes, have a right to terminate the agreement if it becomes obli-
gated to reimburse its bank counterparty for such costs.
C. Illegality
Illegality of performance may also be included as an event which
ing into the swap in the normal course of its business. Also, the breadth of the definition
of "industrial and commercial profits" varies considerably from treaty to treaty. Compare
Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, art. 11 (h),
2 U.S.T. 1753, 1755, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 ("includes manufacturing, mercantile, mining, fi-
nancial and insurance profits") with Convention Between the United States of America and
the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, July 22, 1954, art. III (1), 5 U.S.T. 2769, T.I.A.S. No. 3133, as amended by
Protocol, Sept. 17, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920 ("income derived by an enter-
prise engaged in trade or business in such other state").
36 See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kindgom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, art. 22(1), 31 U.S.T. 5669, 5685, T.I.A.S. No.
9682 ("Items of income of a resident of a Contracting State, wherever arising, not dealt
with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State"). This
clause would provide no protection if the counterparty maintained a U.S. permanent es-
tablishment to which the swap payments were connected.
37 Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Re-
serve Board, and Bank of England, Agreed Proposals of the United States Federal Banking Supervi-
sory Authorities and the Bank of England on Primary Capital and Capital Adequacy Assessment (Jan.
8, 1987).
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permits a party to terminate the agreement. The illegality clause
serves two purposes: (1) in order to avoid the risk of becoming a
defaulting party on the next payment date, a party for which it has
become illegal to perform will be permitted to terminate the agree-
ment; and (2) where its counterparty has become unable to perform
by reason of a change in law, a party can terminate the agreement
immediately rather than being forced to make a payment with the
knowledge that the counterparty will not be able to perform in the
future. An illegality clause may be especially significant in a currency
swap which provides for netted out termination payments in one cur-
rency if the illegality is based on a foreign exchange regulation which
prohibits payment by a party in another currency.
Most agreements providing for the right of termination in the
event of taxes, increased costs, or illegality by one or both of the
parties, also include one of the three following conditions as a pre-
requisite to terminating the agreement: the parties must first negoti-
ate in good faith to restructure the agreement; the parties must
change the relevant booking offices to avoid the adverse impact of
the change; or the terminating party must use its best or reasonable
efforts to avoid the impact of such change.
D. Termination
The enforcement provisions of a swap agreement provide the
remedy for a breach of the substantive credit controls and, failing
negotiations, enable the parties to avoid a change in law which has
altered the basis of their arrangements. These clauses entitle the
non-defaulting party or the party affected by the change in law to
terminate the swap agreement and allocate the gains or losses on
termination.
Termination may be a last resort because in some instances a
party will prefer to take legal action for a specific breach. For exam-
ple, if there is a willful payment default (where an agreement has
become unfavorable to the payor), the other party could elect not to
terminate and sue for the specific payment due, as well as generally
claim under standard provisions in the agreement for reimburse-
ment of legal expenses.
There are a number of legal limitations on the right to termi-
nate. The first and most significant limitation on the right of termi-
nation is found in jurisdictions with insolvency laws which are based
on the principle of reorganization rather than liquidation. 38 Reor-
ganization-oriented insolvency laws are unsympathetic to termina-
tion and generally restrain enforcement in order to permit the
38 For a comparison of U.S. and English insolvency laws, see S. Henderson & Cates,
Termination Provisions of Swap Agreements under U.S. and England Insolvency Laws, EUROMONEY
SWAP FINANCING (1986).
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insolvent party to restructure its affairs and, hopefully, to emerge as
a viable entity. Liquidation oriented insolvency laws, on the other
hand, generally favor termination of contracts and the distribution of
the insolvent party's assets.
The bankruptcy laws of the United States are primarily reorgani-
zation-oriented. 39 The primary U.S. insolvency laws are federal laws
(rather than state laws). These laws apply to bankruptcy proceedings
conducted anywhere in the United States regardless of the jurisdic-
tion where the debtor is incorporated and of the choice of contract
law governing the terms of any particular agreement. 40
Because both parties have obligations remaining to be per-
formed, a swap agreement is likely to be held an "executory" con-
tract under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 1 This mutuality of
obligation also makes it unlikely that a swap agreement would be
held a financial accommodation. 4 2 In this case, the clauses in the
agreement permitting the solvent party to terminate by reason of the
insolvency proceedings or financial condition of the insolvent party
(collectively, "ipsofacto clauses") are not effective. 4 3 The debtor in
39 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-46 (1982). Chapter 11 provides for the financial
reorganization of the debtor pursuant to the terms of a court approved plan of reorganiza-
tion. There are certain entities, e.g., domestic and foreign banks, that cannot be subject,
as a debtor, to a case under the Bankruptcy Code. The insolvency proceedings of such
entities are governed by both state and federal statutes. E.g., id. § 109(b)(2).
40 The Bankruptcy Code preempts state insolvency laws to the extent that the latter
are inconsistent with it. See, e.g., Missouri v. United States Bank. Ct. for E. Dist. of Ark.,
647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982). Although the U.S. bank-
ruptcy court will refer to substantive state law on matters of contractual interpretation, the
relevant contract law (whether that of a State or of a foreign country) is in effect modified
or overridden in a U.S. insolvency proceeding to the extent inconsistent with the U.S.
federal insolvency laws. As a general rule, however, the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code do not become operative unless and until a case has been commenced under its
provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
41
Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it gen-
erally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent
on both sides. A note is not usually an executory contract if the only per-
formance that remains is repayment. Performance on one side of the con-
tract would have been completed and the contract is no longer executory.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
58 (1978).
42 If a swap agreement "is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing
or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor" within the meaning of II
U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982), the solvent party would be entitled to suspend its performance
under the swap agreement and seek relief from the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a) in
order to terminate the swap agreement, such termination being deemed to be retroactively
effective as of the date immediately preceding the commencement of the case. There is,
however, no useful precedent on the issue of whether or not a swap agreement is a finan-
cial accommodation, as no U.S. bankruptcy court has fully adjudicated a swap agreement.
The scant case law interpreting the phrase "financial accommodation" in § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, indicates that a swap agreement would not constitute a finan-
cial accommodation. See, e.g., In re Adana Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 12 Bankr. 977, 987 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980) ("[tihe obligation to pay money on the obligation of another is a financial
accommodation") (emphasis added).
43 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1982).
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possession, or the trustee in bankruptcy (collectively, the "trustee"),
has the right, subject to court approval, to reject the swap agree-
ment, to assume and perform it, or assume and assign it to a third
party regardless of any attempted or purported automatic clause in
the swap agreement. 44 In deciding whether to approve the assump-
tion or rejection of an executory contract, the court is likely to apply
the "business judgment" test. This test involves the determination
of whether the debtor, as a business matter, is better off as a result of
the assumption or rejection of the contract. 45
If the trustee chooses to reject the swap agreement, then, under
section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, the swap agreement is
deemed breached and thus terminated, usually as of the date imme-
diately preceding the commencement of the bankruptcy case.46
Conversely, if the swap agreement is assumed, it is fully binding
on the debtor or, if assigned by the trustee, binding on the assignee
and the solvent party according to its terms. There is an exception
for the terms of any ipsofacto clauses.47 Under section 365(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee or the assignee must cure all existing
defaults other than the ipsofacto clauses.48 The trustee or assignee is
also required to provide "adequate assurance" of future perform-
ance under the contract.49 Such assurance would be a showing of
financial ability to perform in the future or collateralization. 50 The
assurances accepted and approved by the court may not be what the
solvent party was anticipating or would have preferred. 51
If the court approves an assignment of the swap agreement and
the trustee assigns the contract, the trustee and the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate are relieved from any liability for any breach of the
swap agreement occurring after the assignment. Thus, after the as-
signment, the solvent party may look only to the assignee for
44 Id. § 365(d). In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortg. Co., 715 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir.
1983).
45 N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
46 11 U.S.C. § 3 6 5 (g) (1982).
47 In re Marple Publishing Co., 20 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (dealing with
assumption of executory contracts and unexpired leases); but see In re Schatz Fed. Bearings
Co., 5 Bankr. 549, 552-53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (an assumed contractual obligation to
provide vacation pay was binding on the debtor as an administrative expense only to the
extent that performance under contract actually benefitted the bankruptcy estate).
48 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., In re Berkshire Chem. Haulers, Inc., 20 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. D.C. Mass.
1982). "[A] debtor who seeks to provide adequate assurance of payment ... out of future
business operations, must show a sufficient likelihood of profitability such that the Court
would be reasonable in assuming that the debtor would satisfy its obligations under
365(b)(1)." Id. at 459.
51 See, e.g., In re Ridgewood Sacramento, Inc., 20 Bankr. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1982)
(creditor not entitled to any form of adequate assurance of future performance where con-
tract was not in default on date that trustee assumed contract).
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performance. 5 2
After the trustee has assumed the contract, the debtor could
compel performance. 53 Hence, a solvent party may find itself in this
dilemma: its right to terminate is not enforceable; it is required to
make payments to the debtor while rates are unfavorable; and, when
rates move in favor of the solvent party, the debtor ceases to perform
and rejects the contract, leaving the solvent party with a claim for
damages. Such rejection would then enable the solvent party to ter-
minate the agreement and file a proof of claim for damages.54
Even in situations not involving insolvency, courts have refused
to uphold termination of agreements for breaches deemed by the
court to be immaterial or not central to the performance of the de-
faulting party's primary obligations.55 In addition, general equitable
considerations and questions of contract interpretation can result in
the termination being enjoined, as illustrated in a recent case before
the Superior Court of the State of California, Beverly Hills Savings v.
Renault Acceptance B. V56 In 1983, Beverly Hills, a California
chartered savings and loan association, and Renault entered into a
swap agreement. Beverly Hills agreed to pay to Renault interest at a
fixed rate (approximately 12.37 percent) and Renault agreed to pay
to Beverly Hills interest at LIBOR, on a notional principal amount of
twelve million dollars. 57 As security for the obligations of Beverly
Hills under the agreement, it delivered collateral in the amount of
approximately two million dollars to Bank of America as pledge-
holder for Renault. 58 The agreement permitted either party to ter-
minate the agreement and recover damages on the occurrence and
continuation of the following event: "the [other party] has become
insolvent or . . .has appointed or suffered to be appointed any re-
ceiver or trustee of the whole or any material part of the
assets. ... ."59
In April 1985, Beverly Hills was declared insolvent by the U.S.
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") and
52 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (1982) provides: "Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a
contract or lease assumed under this section relieves the trustee and the estate from any
liability for any breach of such contract or lease occurring after such assignment." Id.
53 Depending on the stage of the insolvency proceedings at the time of such rejec-
tion, the solvent party's claim for damages may have some priority over other unsecured
claimants. Id. §§ 365(g), 726(b).
54 Id. § 3 65(g); 2 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUTrcY 385.08 (15th ed. 1979).
55 See Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 706 F.2d 193
(7th Cir. 1983); Fifty States Management v. Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 389
N.E.2d 113, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1979). WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 776 (3d ed. 1961).
56 No. C549684 (Super. Ct. L.A. Cal. June 19, 1985) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
57 Plaintiff's Complaint, at 3, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
58 Id. at 4.
59 Plaintiff's Complaint, exhibit I at 3, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
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went into receivership. 60 Its assets were immediately transferred to a
new federally chartered savings and loan association at the same lo-
cation and with the same name. Beverly Hills was in compliance with
all provisions of the agreement except the above-quoted event of ter-
mination. Upon learning of Beverly Hills' insolvency and recon-
struction, Renault terminated the agreement and entered into a
replacement swap agreement. 61 Renault calculated its damages in
accordance with the compensation provision of the agreement and
requested that Bank of America sell the collateral and pay the
amount of such damages to Renault. Beverly Hills brought an action
to restrain Renault from terminating the agreement and realizing on
the collateral. 62
Beverly Hills contended it was essentially the same institution as
before, except more solvent, and at the time of the purported termi-
nation by Renault it was not insolvent. 63 Thus, any event of termina-
tion which may have occurred was no longer continuing, and was not
continuing on the date of Renault's attempted termination. It was
also argued that an assignment by operation of law could not be
blocked contractually. 64 Beverly Hills finally contended that permit-
ting the agreement to be terminated by Renault would disrupt public
confidence in the orderly transfer of assets to the new Beverly
Hills. 65
Renault's position was relatively straightforward. 66 The agree-
ment provided that Renault could terminate the agreement and col-
lect the stated damages if Beverly Hills became insolvent. Because
the original Beverly Hills became insolvent Renault is entitled to ter-
minate the agreement. Furthermore, Renault argued that the new
Beverly Hills is an institution on which Renault has no information
and with which it has no relationship. 67 Any purported assignment
to the new Beverly Hills would not be effective since the agreement
barred assignment. In this connection, Renault noted that the
FSLIC documentation for the transfer of assets to the new Beverly
Hills contemplated that some depositors might not consent to the
transfer, in which case FSLIC would pay them off and claim on an
indemnity from the new Beverly Hills. 68 Renault argued that this
implied an acknowledgement that the transfer of obligations would re-
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum at 2, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id. at 10.
66 Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
67 Id. at 3.
68 Id. at 8.
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quire the consent of the creditors. 69
A temporary restraining order was granted on May 3, 1985,70
and a preliminary injunction was granted on June 19, 1985.71 These
court orders prohibited Renault from terminating the agreement
and Bank of America from disposing of the collateral. Beverly Hills
has continued to make the payments under the agreement. Since the
date of the court orders, the parties have apparently been trying to
settle the dispute through negotiation.
On February 5, 1986, Beverly Hills brought a motion to compel
payment of the interest that had accrued on the collateral. 72 One
reason for requesting the payment was that Renault was withholding
permission to pay the interest in order to improve its negotiating
position in settlement discussions. 73 On March 7, 1986, Renault
filed a reply brief, arguing that the documentation provided for in-
terest to be retained for the benefit of Renault during the period of
default and that the solvency of the new Beverly Hills, even after the
reconstitution, was still in question.7" While the original court or-
ders blocked it from terminating, Renault argued that this order
should not be construed as holding that a default had not oc-
curred. 75 Therefore, retaining the interest was necessary to protect
Renault's secured position. Renault finally argued that to deny it
collateral protection would be to cut off sources of funding for all
thrift institutions, since confidence in enforcement of parties provid-
ing financing would be eroded. 76 On March 12, 1986, the court de-
nied the Beverly Hills motion. 77
If the parties reach a negotiated settlement, the merits of this
case will never be determined. Nevertheless, Beverly Hills is helpful in
illustrating the legal and judicial restraints, not evident from the ex-
plicit terms of the agreement, which courts will apply before termi-
nating a swap agreement.
E. Compensation
To be fully effective, the right to terminate must be coupled with
the right to receive compensation upon termination. Most swap
agreements permit a non-defaulting party which terminates an
agreement to receive compensation for its loss, and to retain any
69 Id.
70 Beverly Hills (No. C549684) (order granting temporary restraining order).
71 Id. (order granting preliminary injunction).
72 Motion to compel payment, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
73 Id.
74 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion Regarding Pre-
liminary Injunction at 6, Beverly Hills (No. C549684).
75 Id.
76 id. at 7.
77 Beverly Hills (No. C549684) (order denying plaintiff's motion to modify preliminary
injunction).
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gain on termination. The non-defaulting party may be able to reap a
substantial windfall profit by termination if rates have moved against
its position in the swap to the benefit of the defaulting party. Conse-
quently, it is more likely that such a termination and compensation
provision will be deemed a penalty rather than a payment provision
based on the actual economic gains and losses of both parties. This
is especially true where the court determines that the intent of the
parties is to compel performance. 78 This "penalty" aspect of the ter-
mination and compensation provision could possibly make the provi-
sion unenforceable.7 9
As mentioned above, courts often refuse to uphold termination
provisions in agreements where the breaches are deemed immaterial
or not central to the performance of the defaulting party's primary
obligation. It follows that the more onerous the result of termina-
tion, the less likely a court would view a given breach as central to
the agreement. Thus, Renault's position in Beverly Hills would have
been much less attractive if rates had risen after the agreement's
commencement, and termination would have resulted in a gain to
Renault. Similarly, a trustee in a bankruptcy will be much less likely
to reject an agreement (and hence permit termination) if the result is
a loss of profit to the debtor in the agreement. The draconian result
of a one-sided compensation obligation on termination may be to
force a court into neither supporting the agreed compensation nor
permitting termination on grounds of contract law or relevant insol-
vency laws.
Compensation may be based either on a general indemnity or by
a contractually defined method. Termination provisions based on an
imdemnity provide that the defaulting party will indemnify the non-
defaulting party for all of its losses and damages occasioned by ter-
mination of the agreement, usually describing in general terms the
various forms of redeployment the parties might choose. Termina-
tion provisions providing a defined method for calculating damages
refer to the cost to the parties in recreating the cash flows under the
terminated swap agreement. The cost is determined by either a
formula, which compares two termination amounts based on a series
of borrowings and investments, or "agreement value," which is
based on the cost of entering into a replacement swap.
The formula approach, which presupposes the parties will re-
78 Truck Rent-a-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 361 N.E.2d
1015, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1977) (reaffirming rule that liquidated damages provision which
does not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual economic loss suffered by the non-
breaching party will be treated as a penalty and not enforced).
79 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210-11, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1031
(1970); Royal Indem. Co. v. Kenny Constr. Co., 528 F.2d 184, 190 n.7 (1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 921 (1976); Leaseway of Cent. N.Y. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 81 A.D.2d 1038, 440
N.Y.S.2d 118, aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 822, 427 N.E.2d 950, 443 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1981).
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place the revenues and liabilities of the terminated swap through a
combination of borrowings and investments, was the preferred
method of defining damages prior to the existence of a well-devel-
oped and deep swaps market. Using the currency swap illustrated in
Figure 4, Party C would pay, to Party D the Swiss franc termination
amount which is the amount that must be either borrowed or in-
vested, to recreate the Swiss franc cash flow. In other words, Party C
pays Party D the present value of the future Swiss franc payments
(including the notional Swiss franc principal amount at maturity) us-
ing the then current long-term fixed rate as the discount factor, and
Party D pays Party C the notional dollar principal amount.80 Under
most agreements, the defaulting party is required to pay the excess
of its termination amount over the other (netted, in a currency swap,
at the current spot exchange rate on the close-out date) but, as dis-
cussed above, the non-defaulting party is not required to pay if its
closing amount (as so netted) is the larger. Other agreements pro-
vide that each party pay its termination amount to the other, or that
the party with the larger closing amount (at then spot rates) pays the
difference. In addition to formula calculations, the defaulting party
is usually obligated to pay enforcement and other directly related
costs. Minor adjustments must be made if the termination date is
not a scheduled payment date or if there are margins over or below
the floating rate under the swap.
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80 The reader will note that the present value of a principal amount from a future
date, which principal amount carries interest at a floating market rate (adjusted for any
margin), is that principal amount.
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Implicitly, each party is borrowing the amount it pays and in-
vesting the amount it receives. The element of fault therefore be-
comes relevant in the formulas for the choice of the rates used in
discounting the relevant fixed rate amounts back to the termination
date. Party D can presumably invest the Swiss francs in a high qual-
ity obligation at a lower rate than the rate at which Party C can bor-
row Swiss francs. Thus, depending on whether or not the formula
uses the lower investment rate or the higher borrowing rate as the
discount factor, the Swiss franc termination amount is larger or
smaller, respectively. The choice of the investment rate or the bor-
rowing rate generally depends upon which of the parties is perceived
to be at fault. Thus, if Party C is in default, the investment borrow-
ing rate would be used. Often, if the close-out event is "neutral,"
such as illegality or imposition of withholding taxes, the parties will
agree to use an average of the borrowing and investment rates.
In interest swaps in the same currency, the formula assumes a
borrowing/investment of the notional principal amount at a rede-
ployment rate equal to the fixed rate prevailing in the market at the
time of termihation for the balances of the term of the swap agree-
ment. Again, choice of the borrowing or investment rates as the re-
deployment rate will depend on which party was in default. Notional
payments of principal on maturity of the swap can be disregarded
(since in this case such notional payments are equal in amount and
therefore a "wash") and only the redeployment rate at the time of
termination over the remaining period of the transaction is com-
pared to the original fixed rate. The product (adjusted for semi-an-
nual, quarterly or other periodic payment dates) of the difference
between those rates, expressed as a percentage, and the notional
principal amount is then discounted back from each settlement date
to the termination date.
If the redeployment rate at termination exceeds the fixed rate
under the agreement, the aggregate present values would be payable
by Party B (unless it is in default), because it is able to receive more
income from the investment than under the swap, while Party A will
pay more on its borrowing than under the swap. This is illustrated in
Figure 5. If the prevailing fixed rate at termination is less than the
agreement's fixed rate, the aggregate present values would be paya-
ble by Party A (unless it is in default). Additional calculations must
be made to provide for payment of accrued amounts. Calculation of
any gain or loss on redeployment of the floating amount during the
current floating period resulting from termination other than on a
scheduled payment date must also be made. Compensation for mar-
gins over or below LIBOR would be effected by the termination
amount receivable by a party receiving the margin over LIBOR or a
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party paying a margin under LIBOR being increased by the present
value of the future margin payments.
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The agreement value approach, the present market standard,
presupposes that the parties will replace the revenues and liabilities
of the terminated swap through a replacement swap. Thus, if Party B
were in default, the termination amount payable to (or by) Party A
would be the cost (or profit) to Party A in inducing a substantial and
creditworthy third party to enter into a swap with Party A on substan-
tially the same terms as those set forth in the agreement being termi-
nated. If Party A were in default, the relevant termination amount
would be the cost (or profit) of Party B in inducing such a third party
to enter into such a fee. Such a cost or profit could be determined
on the basis of the average of quotations from either a list of speci-
fied swap participants or entities which are described generally. If
the event of termination were a neutral event, the parties could
choose to average the two amounts.
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FIGURE 6
Fee Fee
The agreement value approach may be analyzed in the same
terms as the formula approach except the agreement value approach
utilizes current fixed rates in the swap market as the redeployment
rate, rather than the investment or borrowing rate. This is illustrated
in Figure 6. For instance, assume that quotations obtained in the
swap market would currently result in a fixed rate of 9.3 percent
against LIBOR and that an older swap with a fixed rate of 12 percent
is being terminated. The current fixed rate in the swaps market is
thirty basis points (0.3 percent) over the treasury rate (which is usu-
ally the investment rate in the formula approach). A strong corpora-
tion's borrowing rate may be approximately sixty basis points (0.6
percent) over the treasury rate. If the fixed rate payor was in default,
a replacement fixed rate payor would price its fee for entering into a
replacement swap with the floating rate payor as the present value of
the difference between 12 percent and 9.3 percent, on the notional
principal amount, using a treasury rate as the discount factor.
Worded another way, the replacement rate payor would require an
amount it could invest elsewhere (presumably in U.S. treasury secur-
ities) to yield 2.7 percent on the notional principal amount on each
future payment date. It would apply each such amount to reduce its
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fixed rate obligation under the replacement swap agreement to mar-
ket levels in effect at termination of the defaulted agreement.
If the floating rate payor was in default, a replacement floating
rate payor would be willing to pay an amount to the fixed rate payor
which would result in the new floating rate payor earning an accepta-
ble rate of return through receipt of the "extra" 2.7 percent on each
future payment date. That rate of return, notionally, would be the
rate of return it would require on a fixed rate loan to the fixed rate
payor, and would represent a combination of current market fixed
rates and an analysis of the creditworthiness of the fixed rate payor.
Thus, implementing the agreement value approach results in a rede-
ployment rate between the borrowing rate and the investment rate.
Most U.S. parties prefer a defined method of calculation over an
indemnity because they are more readily able to monitor periodically
their exposure (or gain) in each swap and in their aggregate swap
portfolio. In addition, a defined method of determining compensa-
tion may make actual damages more predictable and recoverable
since a general indemnity results in the agreement being less certain.
Even if the right to be indemnified is not subject to defense, the
amount claimable under the indemnity (since not specified) is. Gen-
erally, an indemnity is strictly construed against the party which
drafted the indemnity.81 Thus, the benefit of any ambiguity or doubt
accrues to the party not drafting the indemnity.8 2 It will not be en-
forced with respect to contingent losses, and the burden of proof is
on the indemnified party to show actual losses.83 An indemnity is
also subject to defenses such as failure to mitigate or avoid loss.8 4
While these may be desirable in principle, the effect is to raise poten-
tial defenses to an indemnity claim based both on questions of fact
and law. These questions are not likely to be summarily disposed of
at the early stages of litigation. Enforcement thus becomes less
certain.
An indemnity, although difficult to enforce by the indemnified
party, may result in an even larger claim than the parties had antici-
pated. The indemnified party, for example, could claim consequent-
ial damages or damages based on special circumstances which the
indemnitor should or could have been aware.8 5
Finally, the sharing of gains and losses on a neutral termination
(resulting from a change in law, for example) is less "neat" using an
81 Porter v. Avlis Contracting Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 235, 381 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1976).
82 Id.
83 See Adams v. Lindsey, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1974) (contingent
losses); Schelberger v. Eastern Savings Bank, 93 A.D.2d 188, 461 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1983).
84 See Federal Ins. Co. v. Walker, 53 N.Y.2d 24, 422 N.E.2d 548, 439 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1981).
85 ThomasJ. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 314 N.E.2d 37, 357
N.Y.S.2d 705 (1974).
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indemnity than a defined method, because an incentive exists for
each side to inflate its claimable loss or reduce its admitted gain to
the detriment of the other.
The defined damages approach, which rests on an expressly
agreed contractual provision, is subject to fewer defenses and uncer-
tainties than the indemnity approach. A theoretical risk exists that
provisions based on defined damages would not be upheld if found
to result in a "grossly disproportionate" or "unconscionable" recov-
ery not related to actual damage.8 6 Parties attempt to limit this risk
by characterizing the payments as liquidated damages. While help-
ful, such a characterization is not technically correct and, if the re-
sults are found to be "grossly disproportionate," such charac-
terization will not prevent a court from characterizing the payments
as a penalty or contrary to public policy, and therefore unenforce-
able.8 7 Nevertheless, it would be highly unlikely for a characteriza-
tion such as "grossly disproportionate" or "unconscionable" to
apply, because the formulas and agreement values are based on ac-
tual market redeployment rates at the time of termination, and on
redeployment steps generally regarded as reasonable.
VI. Current Key Issues
As previously discussed, the volume of swaps has grown dramat-
ically. Several institutions claim to enter into swap agreements with
an aggregate of twenty billion dollars of notional principal amounts
annually. The broad issue currently addressed by swaps specialists is
the means of removing, or otherwise reducing, swap exposure in
portfolios in order to enable a gain in swaps business in the aggre-
gate and to conduct more business with particular counterparties.
Viewing their primary function as dealers, swaps institutions must be
able to move in and out of positions and view removal or reduction
of swap exposure as a means of facilitating trading. Commercial
banks are concerned that swap transactions utilize credit lines with
particular counterparties, and may view removal or reduction of risk
as eliminating restrictions on the amount of other credit which they
are prudently able to extend to such counterparties.
A. Removal of Exposure
Swaps exposure can be eliminated either through cancellation
(or "unwinding") of agreements or by assignment. In a simple un-
winding, the parties cancel the agreement, usually with one paying a
fee for the cancellation to the other. This fee represents the accumu-
lated loss to the second party and the gain to the first party in the
86 Truck Rent-a-Center, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d at 426, 361 N.E.2d at 1018, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
369.
87 Id.
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transaction. If the agreement is one which contains a defined
method of calculating damages (either by a formula or an agreement
value concept), that calculated gain or loss is often the fee.
Alternatively, the parties could enter into-at current rates-a
reverse "mirror" swap between the parties with all amounts payable
under one agreement being applied against amounts receivable
under the other. There would only be actual payment of the ulti-
mate difference (resulting from the current fixed rate differing from
the original fixed rate). This leaves the risk, which can be minimized
but never totally eliminated, that payments under the two agree-
ments might fail to cancel each other out. Acceptance of this contin-
ued risk is typically based on either tax or accounting analysis, since a
simple unwinding with the payment of a fee could result in a taxable
or reportable event at that time. A reverse mirror swap between the
parties will spread the loss or gain over the remaining life of the
transaction.
A mirror swap may also be written with a new counterparty.
Although the original swap may be viewed as cancelled out, the ag-
gregate credit risk has been doubled. This last approach is thus only
feasible if the intent of the mirror swap is to reduce the risk of rate
fluctuation, or speculation on rate fluctuation, on a portfolio basis,
and not to reduce credit exposure.
Another straightforward way of removing swap exposure is
through assignment and release. In addressing this issue, many par-
ties ignore the fact that in a swap transaction obligations are mutual,
rather than one-sided payment obligations as in a loan or tradeable
security. While this distinction may appear obvious, it is often over-
looked and many agreements do not, in their assignment clauses, in-
clude provisions addressing mutuality. For instance, many
agreements refer only to the assignment of rights, which reference
ignores the issue of assumption of liability by the assignee and re-
lease of the assignor's obligation. Others refer to the assignment of
rights and obligations, which is technically inaccurate since rights are
assigned but obligations are assumed. More importantly, this mis-
leading reference distorts perceptions of what is actually occurring,
since the most significant issue is not just the assignment of rights,
but the assumption by a third party of the original counterparty's
liabilities to the remaining party and the consequent release of the
original counterparty's liabilities. In short, the most significant is-
sues in discussing assignment of a swap is the incurrence of exposure
by the remaining party to a new counterparty.
Traditionally, swap agreements have provided that neither party
could assign its rights (nor, implicitly, effect assumption of its obliga-
tions and be released) without the consent of the remaining party.
An additional provision often provides that such consent shall not be
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unreasonably held. Such a provision is unlikely to provide the de-
sired freedom of maneuver to a party desiring a tradeable swap,
since it must request the remaining party's consent. Another imped-
iment is the fact that the provision is silent as to the assignor's re-
lease from liability. The provision, if it includes the requirement that
consent not be unreasonably withheld, may also be unsatisfactory to
a party desiring to restrict assignments for the following reasons: its
definition of a good credit risk might be different than that of the
assignor; it may desire to keep available credit lines for other types of
more profitable financial transactions with the proposed assignee; or,
perhaps due to institutional problems in the past or disputes over
other credit relationships, the remaining party simply does not wish
to have further credit relationships with the proposed assignee. The
remaining party may not wish to be required to prove reasonable-
ness, nor even to disclose to the proposing assignor the reasons for
its withholding consent.
Those parties most interested in tradeable swaps have at-
tempted forms of relatively free assignability to, and of course as-
sumption by (with the release of the assignor), any of a list of
permitted assignees. These clauses are sometimes followed by a ge-
neric description of other permitted assignees. Most financial insti-
tutions, however, generally must approve either individual credits
with a given entity, or credit lines in an aggregate amount which can
be utilized in a number of different fashions. Questions of prudence
would arise if an institution entered, or was obligated to enter, finan-
cial transactions with entities for which it had not undergone its cus-
tomary credit analysis.
A corporation may also have an interest in retaining control over
the financial institutions with which it conducts business. The corpo-
ration may have a list of approved banks, and the requirement for
compliance with internal procedures for transactions with banks not
on the list. The corporation may derive comfort from having a vari-
ety of transactions with a given bank so that, if credit difficulties arise
in the future, it can rely on that bank to resolve the problems rather
than having to take precipitous action. Such reliance may be illusory
if that bank has assigned the swap agreement and been released. Fi-
nally, for tax or other legal reasons, a party may not wish to deal with
institutions from particular jurisdictions.
Free assignability may also create other credit concerns. For in-
stance, if one party has a series of swaps with another, certain of
those swaps would be favorable to the first party (it is owed money
on a netted basis at that time) and certain of the swaps would be
favorable to the second party. If the latter swaps were assigned by
the second party, the first party could be left with a number of agree-
ments under which it was owed money by the second party but
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against which it had no rights of set-off. Contractual preservation of
these rights of set-off would, of course, be unacceptable to an
assignee.
Finally, permissive assignment clauses often do not include pro-
visions for receipt of closing documents and warranties from the as-
signee as required by the assignor when it entered the agreement.
An institution which customarily obtains closing documents and war-
ranties in swap transactions in order to assure that its counterparty
has due authority to enter into the transaction would generally desire
similar documents from its new counterparty. To the extent that the
remaining party must consent to the assignment or to the form of the
documentation, it may be able to impose reasonable requirements in
connection with the assignment. If a party does not have a right of
consent, it may wish to specify as a condition to assignment addi-
tional objective criteria in the assignment clause. Obviously, a provi-
sion for closing documents would detract from the ease of
assignability.
Swaps can also be transferred on a silent basis through means
analogous to loan participations. Assume that Party A and Party B
have a standard interest rate swap agreement: LIBOR against fixed,
as illustrated in Figure 1. Party B enters into a swap agreement with
Party C on precisely the same cash flow terms (retaining a margin) as
in the agreement with Party A, except that its obligation to pay
amounts to Party C only arise to the extent that it receives corre-
sponding funds from Party A. This does not constitute an assign-
ment of Party B's rights under the first swap agreement, nor does
Party C have any rights against Party A. Party C is obligated to pay
to Party B the amounts payable by Party B under the swap agreement
with Party A, but Party B is not released from its direct obligations to
Party A. On a termination of the agreement by reason of a default by
Party A, the swap agreement with Party C terminates and Party B will
be obligated to pay to Party C all of the amounts it recovers from
Party A on termination.
Party B has thus passed on the credit risk (the risk that Party A
will fail to perform) to Party C, since Party A's failure to perform
reduces pro tanto Party B's obligation to Party C. Were the first swap
agreement to be terminated by Party A by reason of a default by
Party B with the result that Party A did not owe any amount to Party
B, Party B would, of course, be obligated to pay a termination
amount to Party C. Party C incurs the credit risk of both Party A and
Party B, since if the former defaults, Party B has no obligation to pay
Party C and if Party B defaults, Party C has no recourse against Party
A. Party B, of course, is not without any credit exposure since, if
Party C should breach its agreement with Party B, Party B still has its
obligations to Party A on an unmatched basis.
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B. Credit Enhancement
If swaps risk cannot be totally removed, at least it can be re-
duced through traditional means of credit enhancement such as col-
lateralization and guarantees. Many swaps have been written on a
collateralized basis and, as the swaps market expands, an increasing
number of swap agreements may be secured. Questions of collater-
alization applicable to swaps are similar to those applicable to other
executory agreements. The primary risk, as discussed above, is that
a swap agreement cannot be terminated by reason of the bankruptcy
of a counterparty or by general equitable or contractual considera-
tions. Generally speaking, collateralization can take one of three
forms: collateralization on demand on a mark-to-market basis;8 8 col-
lateralization automatically on a mark-to-market basis; or collateral-
ization at the inception of the agreement.
Until the required collateral is delivered, it does not provide any
actual security. An agreement to give collateral is simply an un-
secured obligation which is unlikely to be specifically enforceable.
Failure to deliver collateral is likely to constitute a breach of the
agreement thereby permitting, subject to the restrictions discussed
above, termination.
If the collateral was delivered to the secured party at the incep-
tion of the agreement or at a later date as a condition to the effective-
ness of the agreement, delivery of the collateral is unlikely to be
subject to avoidance under the Bankruptcy Code.8 9 If the delivery of
the collateral occured after the agreement became effective and pur-
suant to a contractual obligation to deliver collateral, whether on de-
mand or automatically as a result of market rate movements, the
pledged collateral would likely be avoided as a preference if it was
delivered within ninety days before the debtor's bankruptcy petition
was filed; 90 or, if the solvent party was an "insider" of the debtor the
preference would likely be avoided if the collateral was delivered be-
tween ninety days and one year prior to the bankruptcy filing and the
debtor was insolvent at the time the collateral was delivered.9'
Assuming a party having valid, enforceable, and non-preferen-
tial collateral terminates a swap agreement pursuant to the provi-
sions of the swap agreement, and its counterparty is not in
insolvency proceedings, it would generally be able to realize on the
88 Collateralization on a mark-to-market basis means that a party must deliver collat-
eral to the other party in an amount determined by periodically valuing the swap agree-
ment, usually through either a formula or agreement value method.
89 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1982) (preference section; applies only to property
transferred "for or on account of an antecedent debt") Id. § 548(a)(2)(A) (fraudulent
transfer section; applies only where debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation").
90 Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
91 Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
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collateral. If its right to terminate is questionable (as in the Beverly
Hills case), its right to realize on the collateral will probably also be
enjoined.
If the counterparty has entered insolvency proceedings under
the Bankruptcy Code, and the solvent party's right to terminate is
permitted by the court, or if the agreement is rejected by the trustee,
enforcement of the solvent party's rights in the collateral is still sub-
ject to the limitations on the rights of secured parties in bankruptcy
proceedings. The right to proceed against the collateral would be
subject to the automatic stay and the solvent party must make a mo-
tion in the bankruptcy court to lift the stay. 92 If the trustee objects to
the solvent party's motion, the trustee must provide adequate pro-
tection of the solvent party's interest in the collateral. The extent of
the adequate protection will be determined on the facts of the indi-
vidual case, and the legal parameters of adequate protection are the
subject of continuing litigation in the U.S. courts. 93 If the collateral
constitutes "cash collateral" within the meaning of section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee will have to apply to the bankruptcy
court before it will be able to use that cash collateral to fund its reor-
ganization. If the solvent party's claim is undersecured, that claim
will be treated as a secured claim to the extent of the collateral and
the remainder of the claim will be treated as an unsecured claim,
regardless of any future appreciation in the value of the collateral. 94
If the solvent party's claim is oversecured, the claim will be treated as
secured, and the solvent party will be entitled to recover therefrom
costs and expenses and interest on its claim to the extent provided in
the solvent party's agreement with the debtor.
If the right to terminate is not permitted by the court or the
trustee assumes, or assumes and assigns, the swap agreement, the
trustee or assignee, as the case may be, remains subject to any provi-
sions in the agreement which require the maintenance of the collat-
eral. If, however, the collateral has been delivered to the solvent
party outside of the swap agreement, and any agreement explicitly
related to the swap agreement, the trustee would be entitled, as dis-
cussed above, to assume and assign the swap to a third party as long
as the third party cures all existing defaults under the swap agree-
ment and provides "adequate assurances of future performance"
under the swap agreement. 95 Again, determination of what consti-
92 Id. § 362.
93 In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); Grundy Nat'i Bank v.
Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In re American Marine Indus., Inc.,
734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 339, rqprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6925; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840.
94 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
95 Id. § 365(b)(1).
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tutes adequate assurances will be made on a case by case basis.
A final means of reducing swap risk is to obtain the credit back-
ing of a third party to the counterparty's obligations. This can be
accomplished either through a guarantee, letter of credit, or a "wrap
around" agreement which becomes effective on termination of the
relevant agreement. If a guarantee is obtained, Party G, for example,
would guarantee all obligations of Party A to Party B under the swap
agreement. This, however, might be unacceptable to Party G, partic-
ularly if it is not a parent or affiliate of Party A.
For instance, if Party A were to fail to make a payment when due
and Party B were to claim under its guarantee, Party G would be
obligated to make the payment to Party B. Subsequent payments, if
any, by Party B to Party A would be payable to Party A. Thus, the
obligation of Party G could be relatively open-ended. Unless it is
satisfied that it has sufficient control over Party A and its affairs and is
able to derive economic benefits from payments to Party A, Party G
may wish only to guarantee any termination amount or damages pay-
able by Party A on termination of the agreement by Party B.
An alternative structure, economically similar to a guarantee,
would be that, if Party A were to default, Party B by notice to Party G
could automatically assign the agreement to Party G. Party B would
be released from its liabilities to Party A, and Party G would in effect
become the direct counterparty of Party A. In either the basic agree-
ment or a separate agreement, Party G would have agreed to pay to
Party B the termination amount, if any, which would have been paya-
ble by Party A on termination of the agreement if it had been termi-
nated on the date of assignment. The assignment and release, with
the irrevocable prior consent of Party A, would be set forth in the
basic agreement.
Party G may prefer not to be required to make a direct payment
to Party B, under a guarantee, a letter of credit or an automatic as-
signment. Instead, it may prefer to step into the place of Party A
under the agreement, particularly where the basic agreement could
be terminated under circumstances where a defined method of dam-
ages would show an amount payable by Party B, but under the terms
of the swap agreement, the default of Party A excused Party B from
making such payment. Thus, Party G might require that if the agree-
ment is terminated, it would enter into a swap agreement on essen-
tially the same terms as the defaulted agreement, in place of Party A.
Party B will want this agreement to be signed immediately (with ef-
fectiveness delayed until termination of the basic agreement).
Therefore, Party B and Party G would, at the time that Party A en-
tered into the agreement with Party B, enter into an agreement on
the same commercial terms, but commencing on termination of the
Party A agreement. Party B, of course, would desire that Party G
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also agree to indemnify Party B in the event that termination of the
basic agreement was not permitted for any reason.
It is not necessary that a guarantor be related to a counterparty
or that the counterparty even be aware of the existence of the guar-
antee. The guarantee may not even be characterized as such. For
instance, a program has been devised between one of the major end
users of swaps and an insurance company pursuant to which the in-
surance company would create a master policy covering the expo-
sure of the end user under specified agreements. A counterparty,
such as a single A-rated U.S. corporate counterparty, would typically
be "found" by a swaps broker or other swaps institution. The end
user would not make its own credit analysis of the counterparty but
would give the insurance company notice of the proposed
counterparty and the terms of the transaction.
The insurance company would have the option to agree to the
addition to the policy of the relevant swap agreement. If it approved
the credit, the rider to the policy would be amended by setting forth
the name of the counterparty and the terms of the agreement. The
end user would periodically pay a premium to the insurance com-
pany calculated on the aggregate market risk of all agreements sub-
ject to the policy. This risk would be calculated for each agreement
on the basis of an agreement value defined method of calculating
exposure. Agreements, using an agreement value calculation at a
given time, indicating that the end user had no risk (i.e., calculating
the agreement value would result in an amount payable by the end
user to the counterparty) would not be deducted from the aggregate
agreement values on which the premium was paid. This type of pro-
cedure could, of course, be applied to an outstanding portfolio of
swap agreements as well as to new agreements.
C. Securitization of Swaps
Exposure can be removed through unwinding, assignment, or
participation. All three of these methods require negotiation and de-
lay which is not fully satisfactory to dealers. Swap exposure can be
reduced through credit enhancement. Nevertheless, as long as
swaps remain mutual obligations, it can be expected that they will
not be tradeable and hence fully transferable. Several possible solu-
tions which would alter the traditional view of swaps are currently
being discussed.
First, if a clearing house were established, swaps might indeed
be tradeable in a manner similar to options and futures on the regu-
lated exchanges. Thus, a swap would in effect be written with the
clearing house. The total positions of individual counterparties
could be netted out with any remaining net exposure being collater-
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alized. The credit of the clearing house would in effect be the sum
total of that collateralization.
Second, swaps may become securitized on a basis similar to that
of recent "cap" and "floor" agreements. A cap is the obligation of a
party to pay the excess of a floating rate (LIBOR, for example, over
an agreed fixed rate). To date, caps have generally been written on
the basis of capped floating rate note or variable certificate of deposit
issues, and the cap "strike" price is usually in excess of the current
market fixed rate at the time the cap is issued.
For example, an issuer issues floating rate notes at a rate of LI-
BOR + '/4 percent, provided that if LIBOR were to exceed 13 per-
cent in any period the rate would be fixed at 13 percent for that
period. A capped floating rate note appeals to an investor which is
willing to receive a present higher return ('/4 percent margin as op-
posed to /I6 percent) and is willing to take the risk that short-term
rates will not exceed 13 percent'during the term of the note or until
a date sufficiently in the future that it would have been compensated
for its then rate exposure. The issuer then enters into a cap agree-
ment with another party or parties pursuant to which it agrees to pay
to such party or parties an amount equal to the product of the princi-
pal amount of the note issue (the excess of LIBOR over 13 percent),
and a fraction representing the number of days in the relevant period
over 360.
The pilrchaser of a cap may be an institution which is concerned
about future increases in interest rates beyond "unacceptable"
levels, such as a savings and loan association with a portfolio of fixed
rate loans, but interest sensitive funding sources. In return for this
protection, the purchaser of the cap may agree to pay the issuer 1/4
percent per annum of the principal amount semi-annually on the
payment dates corresponding to those of the floating rate notes.
The issuer has then effectively obtained funds at LIBOR flat, a sav-
ings of 1/16 percent per annum. Such a transaction is illustrated in
Figure 7.
FIGURE 7
Investors
LIBOR + 1/4%7
(Capped at
13%) I
LIBOR - 13% CAP
ISSUER Semi-annually CUTRAT
1/4%
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Alternatively, the purchaser could pay an amount to the issuer
which, if invested by the issuer, would yield 1/4 percent on each of
those payment dates. This transaction is illustrated in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8
LIBOR - 13%
ISSUER Semi-annually CAPISSUERPURCHASER
Initial Fee or Purchase Price
(P.V. of 1/4% per annum)
In the latter example, viewed from the perspective of both the
issuer and the purchaser of the cap, a one-sided obligation is created.
Although such an instrument can be traded, it is subject to concerns
about taxes (if such an instrument were to fall into the hands of a
party outside the jurisdiction of the issuer), compliance with securi-
ties laws (since such an instrument might be regarded as a security),
compliance with restrictive laws applicable to futures and options,
and an institution's policy on the amount of outstanding tradeable
paper it desires to issue.
In addition, "floors" can be created. A floor is an obligation to
pay the excess of an agreed fixed rate over LIBOR. The type of insti-
tution interested in purchasing a floor would be one concerned that
short-term rates might drop in the future. For example, an insur-
ance company which requires maintenance of a high rate income will
be interested in purchasing a floor.
Carrying this analysis one step further, the swap agreement de-
scribed at the beginning of this article can be re-characterized as sim-
ply a cap and a floor based on the current fixed rate rather than an
"out-of-the-money" rate as found in caps and floors. If each party
were prepared to surrender various rights of set-off against the
other, Party A could deliver a negotiable cap (excess of LIBOR over
the fixed rate) to Party B and Party B could deliver a negotiable floor
(excess of the fixed rate over LIBOR) to Party A. Either party would
be permitted to sell the instrument which it received.
Alternatively, since in the first example the cap and the floors
were both out the money (assuming a current fixed rate of 9 per-
cent), means could be devised to generate income through a trust
arrangement which would bring the respective instruments within
marketable ranges.
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Swap results can also be achieved in a tradeable form through
the issuance of bearer securities in which a swap is implicit, or "em-
bedded," in the security issued. As illustrated in Figure 9, for in-
stance, an issuer may issue notes carrying a coupon payable at a fixed
rate (18 percent) minus LIBOR. This note would appeal to an inves-
tor interested in purchasing a floor, such as an insurance company
concerned about a decline in interest rates. The cash flows under
this note can be notionally restructured as if a fixed rate note were
issued at current fixed rates coupled with a swap with the investor. It
is understood that any excess of LIBOR over the fixed rate in the
notional swap with the investor is payable out of the notional fixed
rate interest amounts received by the investor on the note. The is-
suer can then, through two other swaps, effectively incur a financing
cost of below LIBOR.
Other issuances have been structured to include implicit me-
dium term currency options. In Figure 10, for instance, an issuer
issues 100 million dollars principal amount of notes at LIBOR plus
3/8 percent per annum. Its normal borrowing rate would be at
LIBOR plus '/s percent. On maturity, it pays to the investor the
lesser of 100 million dollars or a reduced amount based on apprecia-
tion of the yen against the dollar. If the yen appreciates to a certain
point, no principal would be repaid. The investor may well be ajap-
anese company which desires higher than normal current income but
is not concerned about (or does not believe that there will occur)
significant appreciation of the yen. This transaction can also be re-
structured as if it were a standard floating rate note coupled with a
currency option written by the investor. The issuer is thus able to
sell, either for 3/s percent per annum payable annually or the present
value of that stream of payments as of the commencement of the
transaction, a currency option to a purchaser. This type of option, if
the premium is paid at the commencement of the transaction, is po-
tentially tradeable with caps and floors discussed above.
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VII. Conclusion
The swaps market continues to grow and evolve. While many
swaps transactions can be characterized as routine, the higher vol-
ume of swaps continues to focus attention on the unresolved legal
and tax issues of even the simplest transaction. In addition, the fer-
tile imaginations of swaps specialists continue to devise novel and
creative structures which go far beyond the development of the legal
context in which swaps operate.
